Behavioral synthesis involves compiling an Electronic System-Level (ESL) design into its RegisterTransfer Level (RTL) implementation. Loop pipelining is one of the most critical and complex transformations employed in behavioral synthesis. Certifying the loop pipelining algorithm is challenging because there is a huge semantic gap between the input sequential design and the output pipelined implementation making it infeasible to verify their equivalence with automated sequential equivalence checking techniques. We discuss our ongoing effort using ACL2 to certify loop pipelining transformation. The completion of the proof is work in progress. However, some of the insights developed so far may already be of value to the ACL2 community. In particular, we discuss the key invariant we formalized, which is very different from that used in most pipeline proofs. We discuss the needs for this invariant, its formalization in ACL2, and our envisioned proof using the invariant. We also discuss some trade-offs, challenges, and insights developed in course of the project.
Introduction
Behavioral synthesis is the process of synthesizing an Electronic System-level (ESL) specification of a hardware design into an RTL implementation. The idea of ESL is to raise the design abstraction by specifying the high-level, functional behavior of the hardware design. Designs are typically specified in a language like C, SystemC, or C++. The approach is promising since the user is relieved of the requirement to develop and optimize low-level implementations. It has recently received significant attention, as the steady increase in hardware complexity has made it increasingly difficult to design high-quality designs through hand-crafted RTL under aggressive time-to-market schedules. Studies have shown that ESL reduces the design effort by 50% or more while attaining excellent performance results [6] . Nevertheless, and in spite of availability of several commercial behavioral synthesis tools, the adoption of the approach in main-stream hardware development for microprocessor and SoC design companies has been tentative. One key reason is the lack of designers' confidence that the synthesized RTL indeed corresponds to the ESL specification. To satisfy the power and performance demands of modern applications, a behavioral synthesis tool applies hundreds of transformations, many involving complex and aggressive optimizations that require subtle and delicate invariants. It is unsurprising that the transformations can contain errors, which can result in bugs in synthesized hardware. Thus it is critical to develop mechanized support to certify the semantic equivalence between ESL and RTL designs. On the other hand, the large difference in abstraction between the two representations makes such certification non-trivial.
Loop pipelining is a critical transformation in behavioral synthesis. The goal of this transformation is to increase throughout and reduce latency of the synthesized hardware by allowing temporal overlap of successive loop iterations. It is performed by most state-of-the-art commercial synthesis tools. Unfortunately, it is also one of the most complex transformations [14] , and creates challenges in developing viable automated certification techniques. In particular, efficient overlapping of loop iterations creates a design that differs significantly from its sequential counterpart. Thus there is little correspondence in internal signals between the two designs, making it infeasible to compare them through automated sequential equivalence checking (SEC).
In this paper, we discuss our ongoing work on using ACL2 for certifying loop pipelining transformations. A short companion paper [11] provides a high-level summary of our approach suitable for general audience. In this paper we provide more ACL2-specific details. Certification of loop pipelining is a part of our larger overall effort targeted towards certifying hardware designs synthesized by behavioral synthesis. An explicit goal of this overall framework is to make use of fully automatic decision procedures to the extent possible. Many components of the project are quite mature, but they are based on automatic sequential equivalence checking (SEC). The work discussed here is the key theorem proving component. We discuss the overall framework and how our work fits with the rest of the components in Section 2.
Our ACL2 proof is ongoing, and its completion will still require significant work. Nevertheless, our work so far has already produced insights that we believe are worth disseminating to the community. The paper touches upon the following three points.
First, a key technical contribution is the invariant we defined. It differs from a typical invariant used for correctness of pipelined systems in that it explicitly specifies the correspondence between the sequential and pipelined programs at each transition. We elaborate on our definition in Section 5.
Second, our project is somewhat different from the traditional applications of ACL2 in hardware verification. First, since an over-arching goal is to exploit automatic decision procedures, we use theorem proving primarily to complement automated tools. Second, we eschew theorem proving on inherently complex or low-level implementations. Third, interactive theorem proving is acceptable for one-time use, e.g. in certification of a single transformation, but not as part of a methodology that requires ongoing use in certification of each design. The constraints are imposed by the the environment in which we envision our framework being deployed: it may not be possible to have a dedicated team of experts doing theorem proving as full-time job. Finally, as discussed above, our approach is targeted towards verification of procedures which are closed-source (and exceedingly complex), thus making traditional program verification techniques unusable. We believe our approach shows a novel way in which theorem proving can be applied even under those constraints, in concert with automatic SEC.
Finally, we comment upon our experience in a new user's experience with ACL2. ACL2, like any other interactive reasoning tool, has a significant learning curve. Unfortunately, most of the participants of the team in this task had no previous exposure to automated theorem proving. In particular, the majority of the work in this effort was done by the first author and it represents her first project in formal methods beyond exercises in the ACL2 textbook. Our experience provides some insight in the complexity of developing industrial-scale solutions with ACL2 from a new user's perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the overall project and explains the context of our theorem proving work. In Section 3 we discuss our formalization of CCDFG, a structure which formalizes intermediate representations used in behavioral synthesis. Section 4 discusses our correctness statement, while Section 5 presents the key proof steps, and the definition of our invariant. In Section 6 we share some insights we gleaned from this experience on difficulty of using ACL2 in a proof project of this scale for a new user.
Background and Context
In this section, we discuss the overall framework of the project we are working on, and how the certification of loop pipelining fits into this project. The description here is, of course, necessarily minimal. The reader interested in a thorough understanding of other components of the project is welcome to review the prior publications [12, 5] .
Behavioral Synthesis
We start with a brief summary of behavioral synthesis, highlighting the aspects necessary to understand the rest of our presentation. Note that behavioral synthesis is a complex technology whose description is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are several behavioral synthesis tools available, including both commercial and academic ones, with extensive manuals, documentations and tutorials providing user-level description of their workings [3, 2, 15] , and we encourage the interested reader to these materials for further information.
At a high level, a behavioral synthesis tool can be best viewed as a "compiler" that takes an ESL description and generates RTL. Analogous to a regular compiler, a behavioral synthesis tool performs the standard lexical and syntax analysis to generate in intermediate representation (IR) . The IR is then subjected to a number of transformation, which can be categorized into three phases.
• Compiler Transformations: These include typical compiler operations, e.g., dead-code elimination, constant propagation, loop unrolling, etc. A design may undergo hundreds of compiler transformations.
• Scheduling Transformations: Scheduling entails computing for each operation the clock cycle of its execution, accounting for hardware resource constraints and control/data flow. Loop pipelining, the subject of this paper, is a component of this phase.
• Resource Allocation and Control Synthesis: This phase involves mapping a hardware resource to each operation (e.g., the "+" operation may be mapped to a hardware adder), allocating registers to variables, and generating a controlling finite-state machine to implement the schedule.
After the three phases above, the design can be expressed in RTL. The synthesized RTL may be subjected to further manual tweaks to optimize for area, power, etc.
Certification Framework
The overall goal of our project is to provide a mechanized framework for certifying hardware designs synthesized from ESL specifications by commercial behavioral synthesis tools. One obvious approach, of course, is to apply standard verification techniques (e.g., SEC or theorem proving) on the synthesized RTL itself. Unfortunately, such a methodology is not practical. The large gap in abstraction between the ESL and RTL descriptions means that there is little correspondence in internal variables between the two. Consequently, direct SEC between the two reduces to cost-prohibitive computation of input-output equivalence. On the other side, applying theorem proving is also troublesome since extensive manual effort is necessary and this effort needs to be replicated for each different synthesized design. On the opposite end of this, it is also infeasible to directly certify the implementation of the synthesis tool via theorem proving. In addition to being highly complex and thus potentially requiring prohibitive effort to formally verify with any theorem prover, the implementations are typically closed-source and closely guarded by EDA vendors and thus out of reach of external automated reasoning communities. To address this problem, previous work developed two key SEC solutions, which we will refer to below as Back-end and Front-end. We then discuss the gap between them, which is being filled by theorem proving efforts.
Back-end SEC:
The key insight behind back-end SEC is that automated SEC techniques, while ineffective for directly comparing synthesized RTL with the top-level ESL description, is actually suitable to compare the RTL with the intermediate representation (IR) generated by the tools after the high-level (compiler and scheduling) transformations have been applied. In particular, operation-to-resource mappings generated by the synthesis tool provide the requisite correspondence between internal variables of the IR and RTL. Furthermore, a key insight is that while the implementations of transformations are unavailable for commercial EDA tools, most tools provide these IRs after each transformation application together with some other auxiliary information. To exploit these, an SEC algorithm was developed between the IR (extracted from synthesis tool flow after these transformations) and RTL [12, 5] . The approach scales to tens of thousands of lines of synthesized RTL.
Front-end SEC: Of course the back-end SEC above is only meaningful if we can certify that the input ESL indeed corresponds to the extracted IR produced after the compiler and scheduling transformations applied in the first two phases of synthesis. To address this, another SEC technique was developed to compare two IRs. The idea then is to obtain the sequence of intermediate representations IR 0 , . . . , IR n generated by the compiler and scheduling transformations, and compare each pair of consecutive IRs with this new algorithm. Then back-end SEC can be used to compare IR n with the synthesized RTL, completing the flow.
A Methodology Gap: Unfortunately, the front-end SEC algorithm can only compare two IRs that are structurally close. If a transformation significantly transforms the structure of an IR then the heuristics for detecting corresponding variables between the two IRs will not succeed, causing equivalence checking to fail. Unfortunately, loop pipelining falls in the category of transformations that significantly changes the structure of the IR. It is a quintessential transformation that changes the control/data flow and introduces additional control structures (e.g., to eliminate hazards). This makes front-end SEC infeasible for its certification. On the other hand, it is also a complex and error-prone transformation, and ubiquitous across different behavioral synthesis tools. Furthermore, most commercial implementations are of course proprietary and consequently not available to us for review; applying theorem proving on those implementations is not viable from a methodology perspective. Thus a specialized approach is warranted for handling its certification.
A Reference Pipeline Approach
To develop a specialized approach for pipelines, our key observation is that while the transformation implementation is inaccessible to us, commercial synthesis tools typically generates a report specifying pipeline parameters (e.g., pipeline interval, number of loop iterations pipelined, etc.). Our approach then is to develop an algorithm that takes as inputs these parameters and an IR C for the design before pipelining, and generates a reference pipelined IR P. Note that our algorithm is much simpler than that employed during synthesis; while the former includes advanced heuristics to compute pipeline parameters (like pipeline interval, number of iterations pipelined etc.), we merely use the values provided by its report. To certify a synthesized RTL with pipelines, it is sufficient to (1) check that our algorithm can generate a pipeline P for the parameters reported by synthesis, (2) use SEC to compare P with the synthesized RTL, and (3) prove (using theorem proving) the correctness of our algorithm.
Previous work [4] in fact justified the viability of steps 1 and 2 above; such a reference pipeline generation algorithm was developed and used to successfully compare a variety of pipelined designs across various application domains. This suggested that the approach of using a reference implementation is viable for certifying industrial synthesized pipelines. However, a key (and perhaps the most complicated) component of the approach, step 3, was missing. The algorithm was not verified (indeed, not implemented in a formal language), rendering the "certification" flow unsound.
The unsoundness mentioned above is not just an academic notion. In fact, merely by going through the formalization process and thinking about necessary invariants, we have already found multiple bugs in this algorithm. Thus it is critical to develop a mechanized proof of correctness of this implementation. Unfortunately, it is not easy to verify the original pipeline generation algorithm as written. Its author was an expert in behavioral synthesis but not in program verification or theorem proving; consequently, the algorithm, while simpler than that implemented in a synthesis tool, was still a highly complex piece of code. In particular, since it was not written with correctness in mind, it is difficult to decompose the algorithm into manageable pieces with nice invariants.
One way to address this problem is to "buckle down" and verify the pipeline generation algorithm (and fixing the bugs found in the process). However, a key insight in our case is that we can get away without verifying such a complex implementation. After all, there is nothing "sacred" about this specific algorithm for pipeline generation: given the steps described above, any verifiable pipeline generation algorithm would suffice. 1 Thus the approach of this paper can be viewed as a rational deconstruction of the pipeline synthesis algorithm of the previous work. We identify the key invariant that we need to maintain for proving computational equivalence between the pipelined and un-pipelined loops and design the algorithm to explicitly maintain that invariant.
CCDFG
In order to formalize and prove the correspondence between pipelined and unpipelined IRs, a first step is to define a formalization of the IRs themselves. We call our formalization of IRs Clocked Control Data Flow Graph (CCDFG). An informal description of CCDFG has been provided before [12] . It can be best viewed as a traditional control/data flow graph used by most compilers, augmented with a schedule. Control flow is broken into basic blocks. Instructions are grouped into microsteps which can be executed concurrently. A scheduling step is a group of microsteps which can be executed in a single clock cycle. The state of a CCDFG at a particular microstep is a list of all the variables of a CCDFG with their corresponding values.
The semantics of CCDFG require a formalization of the underlying language used to represent the individual instructions in each scheduling step. The underlying language we use is the LLVM [8] . It is a popular compiler infrastructure for many behavioral synthesis tools and includes an assembly language front-end. At the point of this writing we support a limited subset of LLVM, which however is sufficient to handle all the designs we have seen. Instructions supported include assignment, load, store, bounded arithmetic, bit vectors, arrays, and pointer manipulation instructions. We define the syntax of each type of statement by defining an ACL2 predicate. For example, in our syntax, an assignment statement can be expressed as a list of a list of a variable and an expression.
(defun assignment-statement-p (x) (and (equal (len x) 1) (and (equal (len (car x)) 2) (first (car x)) (symbolp (first (car x))) (expression-p (second (car x))))))
Here, an expression can further be of multiple types, e.g., load expression (loading the value of a variable from memory), add expression (add two variables), xor expression (xor of two variables) etc., where each expression includes the operation applied to the appropriate number of arguments.
(defun add-expression-p (x) (and (equal (len x) 3) (equal (first x) 'add) (variable-or-numberp (second x)) (variable-or-numberp (third x)))) (defun expression-p (x) (and (consp x) (or (load-expression-p x) (add-expression-p x) (xor-expression-p x)...)))
We provide semantics to these instructions through a state-based operational formalization as is common with ACL2. We define the notion of a CCDFG state, which includes the states of the variables, memory, pointers, etc. Then we define the semantics of each instruction by specifying how it changes the state. Thus, for assignment statement we will have a function execute-assignment that specifies the effect of executing the assignment statement on a CCDFG state.
Defining the semantics of most supported statements is straightforward, with one exception. The exception is the so-called
, where v is a variable, σ and τ are expressions, and bb1 and bb2 are basic blocks: if while execution, the previous scheduling step of the φ -statement is bb1 then it is the same as the assignment statement v := σ ; if reached from bb2 i.e., the previous scheduling step is bb2, it is the same as v := τ; the meaning is undefined otherwise. The construct is complex since the effect of executing this statement on a CCDFG state s depends not only on the state s but also on how s is reached by the control flow. Unfortunately, φ -statements abound in pipelined (and sequential) designs we have worked with -they are used to find the value of loop dependencies. Consequently, the complexity induced by this instruction cannot be avoided.
(defun phi-expression-p (x) (and (consp x) (equal (len x) 1) (consp (car x)) (> (len (car x)) 2) (equal (caar x) 'phi) (phi-l (cdr (car x))))) (defun phi-statement-p (x) (and (consp x) (equal (len x) 2) (symbolp (first x)) (first x) (phi-expression-p (cdr x))))
Here phi-1 recognizes an expression of the form ((E0 b) (E1 b-prime)) where E0 and E1 are expressions and b and b-prime are symbols representing basic blocks. Thus in ACL2, the φ -statement looks like (v (phi ((E0 b) (E1 b-prime)))). Finally, the execution semantics requires the additional parameter prev-bb to track the previous basic block.
(defun choose (choices prev-bb) (if (or (equal (nth 1 (first choices)) prev-bb) (equal (symbol-name (nth 1 (first choices))) prev-bb)) (nth 0 (first choices)) (nth 0 (second choices)))) (defun evaluate-val (val bindings) (if (symbolp val) (cdr (assoc-equal val bindings)) val)) a = 0; i = 0; While(i < N){ a = a + 2; c = i + 3; i = a + c; }
Execution order before pipelining 
Correctness of Loop Pipelining
For the purposes of this paper, a pipelinable loop is a loop with the following restrictions [4]:
1. no nested loop; 2. only one Entry and one Exit block; and 3. no branching between the scheduling steps.
These restrictions are not meant to simplify the problem, but reflect the kind of loops that can be actually pipelined during behavioral synthesis. For instance, synthesis tools typically require inner loops to have been fully unrolled (perhaps by a previous compiler transformation) in order to pipeline the outer loop. Figure 1 (a) illustrates the C code (ESL description) for a loop. The C code does not have a schedule or the concept of a clock cycle. Figure 1(b) shows CCDFG of the sequential loop just before loop pipelining. The loop has three scheduling steps: X, Y and Z. The scheduling step before the loop is Entry and after the loop is Exit. The edges in the CCDFG indicate the control flow. Note that the sequential CCDFG has SSA structure, as a result variable a and i are not assigned more than once and we require the quoted variables a and i . Note that there is a φ -statement in the first scheduling step of the loop. This φ -statement accounts for variables whose values are different based on the first time we enter the loop.
Assuming that each scheduling step takes one clock cycle to complete, one iteration of the sequential design takes three clock cycles and three iterations would take nine clock cycles. Given a pipeline interval of one, three iterations of the pipelined loop takes only five clock cycles as shown in Figure 1(c) . So, loop pipelining is important to reduce latency and improve throughput of the synthesized pipeline circuit. The main lemma involved in the correspondence proof between the sequential and pipelined CCDFG can be stated in ACL2 as follows. 2 (defthm correctness-statement-key-lemma (implies (and (posp k) (posp pp-interval) (posp m) (equal pp-ccdfg (superstep-construction pre loop pp-interval m)) (not (equal pp-ccdfg "error"))) (equal (in-order (get-real (run-ccdfg (first pp-ccdfg) (second pp-ccdfg) (third pp-ccdfg) k init-state prev))) (in-order (run-ccdfg pre loop nil (+ (-k 1) (ceil m pp-interval)) init-state prev)))))
The theorem involves several ACL2 functions, e.g., get-real, superstep-construction, etc. We do not discuss the detailed definitions of these functions in the paper, but they are available with the supporting ACL2 script for this workshop. We provide a brief, informal description of some of the critical functions in the theorem below. Following is an English paraphrase of the theorem.
If the pipeline generation succeeds without error, executing the pipelined CCDFG loop for k iterations generates the same state of the relevant variables as executing the sequential CCDFG for some k iterations. The explicit value of k is given by the term (+ (-k 1) (ceil m pp-interval)).
Two key functions that appear in the theorem above are superstep-construction and run-ccdfg. The functrion superstep-construction combines the scheduling steps of successive iterations to create the "scheduling supersteps" of pipelined CCDFG. If there are data-hazards and pipelined CCDFG cannot be generated as per the pp-interval given, the function generates an "error". The function run-ccdfg runs a CCDFG including a pipelinable loop in three parts, first the prologue before the loop, next the loop itself, and finally the epilogue past the loop. 3 This function is defined as follows, where prefix determines the previous scheduling step of the iteration (required to resolve φ -statements).
(defun run-ccdfg (pre loop post iterations init-state prev) (let* ((state1 (run-block-set pre init-state nil prev)) (state2 (run-blocks-iters loop state1 iterations (prefix loop))) (state3 (run-block-set post state2 nil (prefix post))) state3)) Finally, the function get-real removes from the pipelined CCDFG state, all auxiliary variables introduced by the pipeline generation algorithm itself, leaving only the variables that correspond to the 2 Although we state this lemma as a defthm in the paper, as we mentioned before we have not completed its proof in ACL2. We do have a sufficient proof sketch. However, the final form of this theorem, when proven, can have some differences, e.g., additional hypotheses that we have overlooked so far. 3 Of course one can have the standard function run that executes the entire CCDFG rather than in parts. However, for reasons that will be clear when we define the invariant, in our case it is easier to do most of the work with the execution in three parts and then assemble them into a final theorem about the CCDFG run in the end. sequential CCDFG, 4 and in-order normalizes "sorts" the components in a CCDFG state in a normal form so that the sequential and pipelined CCDFG states can be compared with equal.
Algorithm, Invariant, and Proof
Pipeline synthesis is based on the key observation that execution of successive iterations can be overlapped as long as no data hazard is introduced. Thus, the two main activities of a pipeline synthesis algorithm are to (1) identify possible hazards, and (2) eliminate them, typically by introduction of new variables. In our case, the identification is simplified since the synthesis tool provides a pipeline interval; thus, instead of discovering a pipeline interval ourselves so that no hazard is introduced, we merely need to work with the provided interval.
Remark: In addition to (1) and (2) above, we need another operation to eliminate the thorny φ -statement. The insight behind this procedure is that the φ -statement is used to evaluate values of variables based on the previous basic block; so if the loop is unwound by one iteration the statement can be replaced by corresponding assignment statements (e.g., for the first (unwound) iteration, the assignment statement would correspond to the component of φ in the Entry block, and in the rest it would correspond to the component of φ for the last basic block in the body of the loop). The correctness of φ -elimination is independent of the remainder of the pipeline operations. Once this is performed on CCDFG C, we have a sequential CCDFG C with no φ -statement but whose loop includes a preamble that corresponds to the first iteration of the loop in C and whose "loop body" corresponds to the remaining loop iterations in C.
There are two key operations involved in pipeline synthesis : (1) insertion of shadow variables, and (2) combining microsteps from different iterations of the sequential loop into one "superstep" of the pipelined CCDFG. Inserting shadow variables protects variables that are written and then read within the same iteration from introducing hazards when iterations are overlapped. To understand its role, suppose a variable x is first written and then read in the same iteration and consider overlapping two iterations. Then the write from the second iteration may overwrite the value of x before the read from the first iteration had a "chance" to read the previous value. To avoid this, we introduce a fresh variable x reg, which preserves the old value of x, and reads to x are replaced by reads to x reg. Finally, the superstep construction entails combining scheduling steps of successive iterations (the number of overlapping iterations being defined by the pipeline interval provided). We combine two corresponding scheduling steps from successive iterations if there is no hazard introduced, viz., if a variable is written in scheduling step S and read subsequently in S then S cannot be in a superstep that precedes S. S and S can be in a single superstep since we implement data forwarding. Note that the superstep consruction simply fails if we cannot combine the requisite scheduling steps. So it is possible that although a pipelined CCDFG exists with the provided pipeline interval but we fail to construct it by being conservative in our analysis of potential hazards. However, all our soundness claims are only for pipelines that we can synthesize.
Our key invariant defines a "correspondence relation" between the backedges of the sequential and pipelined CCDFG. The relation can be informally paraphrased as follows [11] .
Let S be a sequential loop and G be the pipelined loop generated from our algorithm. The pipelined loop consists of three stages as depicted in Figure 2 : prologue G p , full stage G l , and epilogue G e . Let s l be any state of G poised to execute G l , and let k be any number such that the loop of G is not exited in k iterations from s l . Then executing G p followed by k iterations of G l is equivalent to executing first iteration of S, say S 1 followed by (k − 1) iterations of S together with a collection of "partially completed" iterations of S. 5 Suppose the number of scheduling steps of the first iteration in pipeline prologue is m and the pipeline interval is i. We calculate the value of m based on the number of scheduling steps in a CCDFG and the pipeline interval. In our example, m is 2 and i is 1. The invariant implies that starting from the same initial state, executing G p and k iterations of G l is the same as executing k iterations of S, followed by m scheduling steps of S, followed by (m -i) scheduling steps of S, by (m -2i) scheduling steps of S, etc. till the number remains positive. The invariant can be defined in ACL2 as follows.
(defun get-m-blocks-seq (m seq-loop pp-interval) (if (or (not (posp m)) (not (posp pp-interval))) nil (if (<= m pp-interval)
(take-n m seq-loop) ; get first m blocks of loop (append (take-n m loop) (get-m-blocks-seq (-m pp-interval) seq-loop pp-interval))))) (defun pipeline-loop-invariant (pp-state k seq-pre seq-loop pp-interval init-state prev m) (let* ((seq-loop-top (run-block-set seq-pre init-state nil prev)) (seq-loop-k (run-blocks-iters seq-loop seq-loop-top (-k 1) prev)) (seq-loop-x (run-block-set (get-m-blocks-seq m seq-loop pp-interval) seq-loop-k nil prev))) (equal pp-state seq-loop-x))) Here, seq-loop-k represents the state after executing seq-loop for k iterations starting from state init-state, seq-loop-x represents the state after executing the blocks defined by function get-m-blocks-seq on the on the sequential loop seq-loop starting from state seq-loop-k. The invariant then says that the state thus obtained is equal to the input pp-state. Note that pp-state is the state obtained by function run-ccdfg-k which executes pipeline prologue and k iterations of pipeline full stage starting from state init-state.
As is standard with proofs involving invariants, there are two obligations to prove the correctness (in this case the main lemma of the previous section -correctness-statement-key-lemma), viz., that it is indeed an invariant, and that its invariance is sufficient to imply the desired correctness theorem. Here we give a sense of our envisioned proof.
Our invariant is defined specifically to make the proof of sufficiency straightforward. Suppose the P is the pipelined CCDFG and S is the sequential CCDFG. Equivalence of CCDFG states of P and S follows from the invariant by noting that the epilogue P e exactly constitutes the incomplete scheduling steps of S specified by the invariant (cf. Figure 3) .
The proof of invariance of this predicate is, of course, the main "work horse" in this exercise. The proof depends on a fundamental idea for pipelining, viz., commutability of independent instructions.
Suppose that the set of variables written and read by two consecutive operations a and b is disjoint. Then executing a followed by b generates the same result as executing b followed by a.
If we view the scheduling steps in Figure 1 as arranged in a matrix, then the sequential execution Assuming that invariant is true for k steps, executing one pipeline full stage on both sides gives us (k + 1) iterations of sequantial loop CCDFG followed by partially completed sequences as expected.
proceeds column-wise along the matrix while the pipelined execution proceeds row-wise. Thus the core proof obligation involves the following two proof requirements.
• Our pipelining algorithm correctly combines the "appropriate" scheduling supersteps which do not have read-write hazards.
• Given that there are no read-write hazards at appropriate places, executing scheduling steps rowwise is same as executing those scheduling steps column-wise in the pipelined CCDFG. This makes use of the fundamental observation above.
Although these requirements justify that our correspondence relation is an invariant, they are used somewhat differently in the base case (when the number of iterations k of the pipelined loop is 1) and inductive step (assume the invariant holds for k iterations of the pipeline and prove that it holds for (k +1) iterations). Their usage is pictorially shown in Figure 4 . For the base case, we commute operations in the loop prologue of the pipeline (which corresponds to the first iteration after unrolling) with the loop body, while for the inductive step we work with two consecutive iterations of the loop.
We have formalized the correspondence-relation. We have also proved the implication chain from this relation to the correctness statement and made progress in the proof of invariance (but not completed it yet). Our current ACL2 script has 125 definitions and 150 lemmas, including many lemmas about structural properties of CCDFGs (but not counting the false starts discussed in Section 6). We are still working on proving some of the key components of the proof obligations to show that the algorithm does not introduce data hazards.
Approaches, False Starts, and ACL2 Experience of a New User
The invariant discussed in the preceding section, even if complex, is somewhat natural in hindsight. However, it is actually the result of several iterations and false starts. In this section we discuss some of these, and also touch upon our experience with using ACL2 for a proof like this, particularly from a new user's viewpoint (see below). We explain these experiences with the hope that they may help other new users attempting something similar to avoid some of the pitfalls.
Our invariant is very different from a typical invariant used in the verification of pipelined machines (e.g., for microprocessor pipelines). We make explicit the correspondence with the sequential execution. The key requirement from a pipeline invariant, viz., hazard freedom, is left implicit and arises indirectly as a proof obligation for invariance of this predicate. Most microprocessor pipeline verification work went the other way. For instance, Sawada and Hunt's invariant [13] , expressed through an intermediate structure called MAETT, "tracks" the instructions as they pass through different pipeline stages to ensure that hazards are not introduced. One difference in our case is that we are not working with a concrete pipeline with a fixed set of operations but an algorithm that generates pipelines with an arbitrary sequence of scheduling steps; a construction like MAETT is thus not directly applicable. However, there is a deeper reason for defining our invariant the way we did. Consider the pipeline in Figure 2 . Ignoring the back edge (e.g., the edge from X to Z in the scheduling step marked "pipeline full" in the pipelined CCDFG), three columns in Figure 2 (b) correspond roughly to three iterations of the sequential loop. Suppose we simply unroll the loop in the sequential design three times, and then use a technique similar to MAETT to track scheduling steps in this "unrolled loop body" in the pipeline execution. Unfortunately, this does not work, because of the back edge. There is no direct correlation between this edge and any edge in the sequential loop. In fact, it is interesting to observe what its introduction achieves: completion of one scheduling step in each of the three partially executed, overlapping loop iterations. This suggests that the invariant must explicitly capture the state of the executions that have been partially completed during each iteration of the pipeline (i.e., each traversal of the back edge).
The above is reflective of one of our major false starts: in our initial approach we had decided to simplify the problem by ignoring the back edge and proving the correspondence between an unrolled loop and the pipeline as outlined above. Only after substantially completing this proof and in attempting to extend it to the pipeline with the back edge did we realize that the extension does not work.
Another false start was in the way we initially formalized hazard freedom. Hazard freedom entails showing the following. "Suppose a variable v is written by a scheduling step S and read subsequently by a scheduling step S in the sequential CCDFG. Then in the pipelined CCDFG, there is no scheduling step P that writes v and is executed between S and S ." Originally, we defined this notion directly for each variable, viz., with a function that statically analyzes the CCDFG to identify the range of scheduling steps between a write and subsequent read of each variable. However, this does not directly work. For example, proving this property for variable x may require a similar property to hold for another variable y (perhaps because x is assigned an expression involving y). But the range of scheduling steps in which x and y are read and written are different, and the extension of the property to all the variables cannot be easily specified by an invariant for any specific scheduling step. Our current approach alleviates this problem in that it succinctly captures an "on-track property", viz., that the state after k pipeline iterations is equivalent to partial execution of a certain number of iterations in the sequential CCDFG (in addition to completion of k iterations) which avoids this problem and can indeed be specified as an invariant.
Perhaps the overall lesson is that it is foolhardy to start mechanization until sufficient outline is completed as hand proof. However, it is impossible to fill in everything with a hand proof. Spotting whether an outline is sufficient requires significant maturity, both with reasoning and with the limits of what is doable automatically with ACL2. Of course, this will certainly always remain a creative process. However, published ACL2 proofs (in the workshop and elsewhere) rarely touch upon false starts, focusing only on the key steps of successful proofs. It is difficult to understand from that material at which level the authors understood the proof before embarking on ACL2 and what paths did or did not work. Our experience directly supports Moore's appeal [10] to highlight "the 'minor' decisions that represent major breakthroughs in the problem" at least in the context of describing successful (or failed) proofs.
The above pitfalls may be a by-product of the team involved in this effort. Of the four authors listed, three have had no previous exposure to theorem proving; the remaining author participated in the project in a consulting and advisory role -helping with questions at a high level and with generic ACL2 proofs. The bulk of the ACL2 work was done by the first author, to whom this was the first project beyond exercises in the ACL2 book. This is clearly not a typical ACL2 project team doing proofs at this scale. Indeed, ACL2 is not designed for effective usage of teams with this level of expertise. For instance, the ACL2 textbook [7] states the following.
It takes weeks or months to learn to use the language and the theorem prover, but months to years to become really good at it.
It also advises the user to start one's ACL2 project with toy exercises. While this is good advice, there are situations where one cannot afford either a large team with ACL2 expertise or the luxury to spend months to years to become proficient ACL2 users. Consequently, we believe it is critical to find ways to address the question of learning curve in theorem proving in order for ACL2 to make effective forays in industrial contexts beyond organizations where it has already been established. We hope that our experience, including the pitfalls mentioned above, will serve as a basis for rethinking and conversation in the ACL2 community on possible self-teaching materials to enable fast ramp-up on ACL2 expertise for industrial and industrial-strength projects.
We end this section with discussion with a few notes on limitations in ACL2 documentation that, although simple once resolved, stumped a new ACL2 user. These are taken directly from the records of the first author during the initial phases of this work as a new user. ACL2 is a complex system. The amount of documentation it provides is impressive, and in our experience, far beyond that by most other tools of similar complexity. Nevertheless, as is expected of a tool with more than two decades of development, there are places where documentation is not complete nor at the appropriate level for a new user. It is our endeavor to point out these corner cases in the hopes that this will improve the documentation further, not to complain about limitations. We hope it will be taken in that spirit. Of course, the documentation has certainly evolved and improved since these notes were taken. We did not check if the current documentation would have addressed the confusion better, since what makes sense as a more experienced user today might not have made sense to a new user.
Commonly used primitives link endp: The first author wanted to understand its usage after seeing some definitions written by others, that used this construct. However, :DOC endp merely suggests that it is the same as atom (a function unfamiliar to her), and then discusses the difference in their guards; :DOC atom suggests it is not a cons (together with a discussion of guards again). In addition to not providing any explanation of the usage of endp, this discussion inadvertently seemed to suggest that one must understand the lengthy documentation on guard to make further progress. Perhaps a small explanation that endp is used as a base case of functions that recur over a list using cdr (e.g., when the list when a list is empty) would have dispelled this confusion early.
Measure and Termination: Most of our functions recur on complex graph structures and one must supply a measure. Unfortunately, documentation at the new user level is lacking. :DOC measure merely points to :DOC xargs. The latter provides an intimidating example that involves all possible xargs (and that the documentation admits is nonsensical). Delving into the :MEASURE argument, one reads the following.
Value is a term involving only the formals of the function being defined. This term is indicates what is getting smaller in the recursion. The well-founded relation with which successive measures are compared is o<. Also allowed is a special case...
What it does not say is what we need to actually put in the measure, and what we need to prove about it. :DOC defun provides a bit more explanation but also with no examples, and the discussion here also seemed to indicate (at least to the author) that one has to understand ordinals at some depth before attempting to provide measure.
Induction Hint: Documentation of induction hint suffers from similar problem. :DOC hint, the topic where one is led from an Internet search for induction hint in ACL2, again provides an example of form of all possible hints, but with little insight on what to write for induction hint and how it will work. The subtopic :induct provides some clue on what to do, e.g., it says the following:
...if value is a term other than t, then not only should the system apply induction immediately, but it should analyze value rather than the goal to generate its induction scheme. Merging and the other induction heuristics are applied.... Admittedly, the first sentence above certainly provides a complete description of what one needs to know to give an induction hint, viz., that the term provided will be analyzed to generate the scheme. However, this cryptic explanation is difficult to translate to an actionable item for actually generating induction. An example where a non-trivial induction hint is used would have helped the user understand how to use it.
String Manipulation Functions: Our project makes significant use of functions for string manipulation. However, finding them in the documentation is a challenge. For example, a simple Internet search on "ACL2 functions for converting strings to symbols" did not turn up with packn, resulting in a number of unsuccessful attempts at defining something equivalent until its existence was pointed to by a more experienced member.
The above is perhaps indicative of a more general problem. ACL2 documentation is vast and complicated, and it is easy to get lost. We typically used Internet search to find a topic of interest. However, this requires a significant, searchable (by Internet search) description of the different available function symbols. Many of these functions may have been developed by the community and may not have adequate descriptions provided, making this a challenge. Perhaps the new initiative of "Combined ACL2 + Community Books Manual" is a step in this direction, if the result becomes searchable via standard Web search.
Of course, documentation suggestions necessarily are narrow and low-level, and one might ask why we bother to point them out in a paper rather than through personal communication with the ACL2 authors, or even try to fix them ourselves in the ACL2+books combined manual which is maintained and developed by the community rather than the authors of ACL2. 6 The reason we nevertheless point them out in the paper is that they are symptomatic of a larger issue which we believe merits deeper discussion, deliberation, and collaboration of the entire community. As pointed out above, the standard model of successful application of ACL2 in the industrial projects has been through the efforts of one or more experts with years of experience in the theorem prover working full-time with ACL2 on an industrial application. However, our experience suggests that this large barrier to entry often dooms the possibility of a new "customer" looking into it as a solution, long before it has had a chance to "prove its mettle" on the customer's problem. Addressing this requires us to rethink how we can make ACL2 useful to promising but new users taking on an industrial project, at least at the level in which a new user can take on other formal verification and validation tools. Our experience suggests that if that were possible, there would be several new industrial partners willing to try it out. However, achieving that does require the community collaboratively rethinking how the theorem prover ought to be presented to such a new user. We do not have a solution to offer, but we hope that our remarks would cause some deliberation and discussion within the community. Identifying documentation pitfalls is a tiny contribution to this effort from our part.
Conclusion
There has been a significant amount of work on pipeline verification, both within and outside the ACL2 community [1, 13, 9, 16] . However, most of pipeline verification research has focused on architectural pipelines, in particular pipelined microprocessors. There are significant differences in goals and techniques between these efforts and ours. Microprocessor pipelines include optimized (hand-crafted) control and forwarding logics, but a static set of operations based on the instruction set. Loop pipelines tend to be deep with a high complexity at each stage, but control and forwarding logics are more standardized since they are automatically synthesized. Furthermore, microprocessor pipeline verification is focused on one (hand-crafted) pipeline implementation, while our work focuses on verifying an algorithm producing pipelines. As we discussed in Section 6, abstraction techniques such as MAETT [13] does not apply to our case and we had to come up with a very different invariant.
Our work is very closely related to recent work on verification of software pipelines. In particular, Tristan and Leroy [14] present a verified translation validator for software loop pipelines. The loop pipelines in behavioral synthesis considered in this paper are close in structure to software loop pipelines, although our formalization (e.g., CCDFG) has different semantics from the Control Flow Graphs they use, reflecting the difference between eventual targets of compilation (viz., hardware vs. software). However, the fundamental difference is in the approach taken to actually certify the pipelines. Tristan and Leroy's approach decomposes the certification problem into two parts, a "dynamic" part that is certified on a case-by-case basis and a "static" part that is certified in the Coq theorem prover once and for all. The theorem proven by Coq is informally paraphrased as follows:
Suppose the pipelining algorithm generates a pipeline P from a sequential design S . Suppose symbolic simulation of S and P verifies certain "dynamic" verification conditions (VCs). Then S and P are indeed semantically equivalent.
Thus for any pipeline instance P generated by their algorithm, symbolic simulation is executed between P and S to certify that P is indeed a correct pipelined implementation of S . The dynamic VCs checked by symbolic simulation essentially certify that the pipeline generation did not overlook any hazards. This is where our work differs from theirs. Our work is expected to provide a single theorem certifying the correctness of the reference pipelined implementation, without requiring further runtime hazard check. Furthermore, their correspondence theorem relates the pipelined implementation with a sequential design with a (bounded) unrolled loop, while our approach certifies the correspondence between the actual Control Flow Graph (CFG) and the pipelined implementation. Indeed, Tristan and Leroy remark that the mechanization of the correspondence between the CFG and unrolled loop is "infuriatingly difficult". We speculate this is so because they focus on verifying the correspondence between the unrolled loop and the pipeline. As we discuss in Section 6, attempting the formal correspondence between the unrolled sequential loop and pipelined design was not possible since there is no formal way to connect to back edge of the loop with any of the edges in the pipeline. We believe that reconciling this problem and developing a fully certified pipeline generation algorithm would require backtracking from the correspondence with an unrolled loop (and hence translation validation) to a more complex invariant like ours. Of course we must note that we can "afford" to develop a fully certified algorithm in our approach since the pipelines are simpler (cf. Section 4); achieving this for arbitrary software pipeline may require further more subtle invariants.
In addition to technical contributions, we see our work as providing an important methodological contribution enabling use of theorem proving in situations where one needs to certify the result of an implementation on which theorem proving cannot be directly applied either because it is closed-source or because it is highly complex: (1) create a reference implementation, perhaps using as much information as available from the actual implementation, in our case information about pipeline intervals, (2) certify this simpler reference implementation with theorem proving, and (3) develop an SEC framework to compare the result of the reference implementation with that of the actual implementation. In addition to making theorem proving applicable on industrial flows without requiring us to certify industial implementations with their full complexity, this approach permits adjusting the algorithm (within limits) to suit mechanical reasoning while still affording comparison with actual synthesized artifacts. We have made liberal use of this "luxury", e.g., we are continually redefining our superstep construction function to facilitate proof of key structural lemmas of the invariant. We believe similar approach is applicable in other contexts and may provide effective use of theorem proving within industrial verification flows.
